Michael Siemer

How flexible are corporate loans after origination? Theory predicts coordination problems should make syndicated loans harder to modify than single-bank loans. We show the opposite. Using comprehensive regulatory data, we document that syndicated loans are modified frequently and respond to borrower distress, while single-lender loans are half as likely to be modified. This gap is not explained by covenants or performance pricing. Instead, syndicated loans are monitored more intensively. We show theoretically and empirically how fixed monitoring costs generate scale economies: larger loans justify continuous monitoring enabling flexible renegotiation, while smaller borrowers receive arm's-length contracts with limited scope for modifications.

The Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP) was an emergency liquidity facility set up by the Federal Reserve in March 2023 following the failure of Silicon Valley Bank which experienced a classic bank run driven by weak fundamentals. This paper provides an in-depth discussion of the design and implementation of the BTFP and presents some evidence on program outcomes. It also quantifies how the lending terms compare to those of the Discount Window—the Federal Reserve's main standing liquidity facility. The BTFP successfully acted as a backstop source of funding for depository institutions with large unrealized securities losses and heavy reliance on uninsured deposits and, in doing so, helped to avert a potential systemic banking crisis. The program ceased issuing new loans in March 2024 and closed one year later as the last loans matured. All outstanding loan balances were repaid in full.